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Abstract—We establish a construction of optimal authentica-
tion codes achieving perfect multi-fold secrecy by means of com-
binatorial designs. This continues the author’s work (ISIT 2009,
cf. [1]) and answers an open question posed therein. As an
application, we present the first infinite class of optimal codes
that provide two-fold security against spoofing attacks and at the
same time perfect two-fold secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication and secrecy are two crucial concepts in
cryptography and information security. Although independent
in their nature, various scenarios require that both aspects
hold simultaneously. For information-theoretic or uncondi-
tional security (i.e. robustness against an attacker that has
unlimited computational resources), authentication and secrecy
codes have been investigated for quite some time. The initial
construction of authentication codes goes back to Gilbert,
MacWilliams & Sloane [2]. A more general and systematic
theory of authentication was developed by Simmons (e.g., [3],
[4]). Fundamental work on secrecy codes started with Shan-
non [5].
This paper deals with the construction of optimal authen-
tication codes with perfect multi-fold secrecy. It continues
the author’s recent work [1], which naturally extended results
by Stinson [6] on authentication codes with perfect secrecy.
We will answer an important question left open in [1] that
addresses the construction of authentication codes with perfect
multi-fold secrecy for equiprobable source probability distri-
butions. We establish a construction of optimal authentication
codes which are multi-fold secure against spoofing attacks
and simultaneously provide perfect multi-fold secrecy. This
can be achieved by means of combinatorial designs. As an
application, we present the first infinite class of optimal codes
that achieve two-fold security against spoofing as well as
perfect two-fold secrecy.
The paper is organized as follows: Necessary definitions
and concepts from the theory of authentication and secrecy
codes as well as from combinatorial design theory will be
summarized in Section II. Section III gives relevant combina-
torial constructions of optimal authentication codes which bear
no secrecy assumptions. In Section IV, we review Stinson’s
constructions in [6] and recent results from [1]. Section V is
devoted to our new constructions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Authentication and Secrecy Codes
We rely on the information-theoretical or unconditional se-
crecy model developed by Shannon [5], and by Simmons
(e.g., [3], [4]) including authentication. Our notion complies,
for the most part, with that of [6], [7]. In this model of
authentication and secrecy three participants are involved:
a transmitter, a receiver, and an opponent. The transmitter
wants to communicate information to the receiver via a public
communications channel. The receiver in return would like
to be confident that any received information actually came
from the transmitter and not from some opponent (integrity of
information). The transmitter and the receiver are assumed to
trust each other. Sometimes this is also called an A-code.
In what follows, let S denote a set of k source states (or
plaintexts), M a set of v messages (or ciphertexts), and E
a set of b encoding rules (or keys). Using an encoding rule
e ∈ E , the transmitter encrypts a source state s ∈ S to
obtain the message m = e(s) to be sent over the channel.
The encoding rule is an injective function from S to M, and
is communicated to the receiver via a secure channel prior to
any messages being sent. For a given encoding rule e ∈ E , let
M(e) := {e(s) : s ∈ S} denote the set of valid messages. For
an encoding rule e and a set M∗ ⊆M(e) of distinct messages,
we define fe(M∗) := {s ∈ S : e(s) ∈ M∗}, i.e., the set of
source states that will be encoded under encoding rule e by
a message in M∗. A received message m will be accepted
by the receiver as being authentic if and only if m ∈ M(e).
When this is fulfilled, the receiver decrypts the message m by
applying the decoding rule e−1, where
e−1(m) = s⇔ e(s) = m.
An authentication code can be represented algebraically by a
(b×k)-encoding matrix with the rows indexed by the encoding
rules, the columns indexed by the source states, and the entries
defined by aes := e(s) (1 ≤ e ≤ b, 1 ≤ s ≤ k).
We address the scenario of a spoofing attack of order i
(cf. [7]): Suppose that an opponent observes i ≥ 0 distinct
messages, which are sent through the public channel using the
same encoding rule. The opponent then inserts a new message
m′ (being distinct from the i messages already sent), hoping to
have it accepted by the receiver as authentic. The cases i = 0
and i = 1 are called impersonation game and substitution
game, respectively. These cases have been studied in detail
in recent years (e.g., [8], [9]), however less is known for the
cases i ≥ 2. In this article, we focus on those cases where
i ≥ 2.
For any i, we assume that there is some probability dis-
tribution on the set of i-subsets of source states, so that any
set of i source states has a non-zero probability of occurring.
For simplification, we ignore the order in which the i source
states occur, and assume that no source state occurs more
than once. Given this probability distribution pS on S, the
receiver and transmitter choose a probability distribution pE
on E (called encoding strategy) with associated independent
random variables S and E, respectively. These distributions
are known to all participants and induce a third distribution,
pM , on M with associated random variable M . The deception
probability Pdi is the probability that the opponent can deceive
the receiver with a spoofing attack of order i. The following
theorem (cf. [7]) provides combinatorial lower bounds.
Theorem 1: [Massey] In an authentication code with k
source states and v messages, the deception probabilities are
bounded below by
Pdi ≥
k − i
v − i
.
An authentication code is called tA-fold secure against
spoofing if Pdi = (k − i)/(v − i) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ tA.
Moreover, we consider the concept of perfect multi-fold
secrecy which has been introduced by Stinson [6] and general-
izes Shannon’s fundamental idea of perfect (one-fold) secrecy
(cf. [5]). We say that an authentication code has perfect tS-
fold secrecy if, for every positive integer t∗ ≤ tS , for every
set M∗ of t∗ messages observed in the channel, and for every
set S∗ of t∗ source states, we have
pS(S
∗|M∗) = pS(S
∗).
That is, the a posteriori probability distribution on the t∗
source states, given that a set of t∗ messages is observed,
is identical to the a priori probability distribution on the t∗
source states.
When clear from the context, we often only write t instead
of tA resp. tS .
B. Combinatorial Designs
We recall the definition of a combinatorial t-design. For
positive integers t ≤ k ≤ v and λ, a t-(v, k, λ) design D
is a pair (X,B), satisfying the following properties:
(i) X is a set of v elements, called points,
(ii) B is a family of k-subsets of X , called blocks,
(iii) every t-subset of X is contained in exactly λ blocks.
We denote points by lower-case and blocks by upper-case
Latin letters. Via convention, let b := |B| denote the number
of blocks. Throughout this article, ‘repeated blocks’ are not
allowed, that is, the same k-subset of points may not occur
twice as a block. If t < k < v holds, then we speak of a
non-trivial t-design. For historical reasons, a t-(v, k, λ) design
with λ = 1 is called a Steiner t-design (sometimes also a
Steiner system). The special case of a Steiner design with
parameters t = 2 and k = 3 is called a Steiner triple system
STS(v) of order v. A Steiner design with parameters t = 3 and
k = 4 is called a Steiner quadruple system SQS(v) of order v.
Specifically, we are interested in Steiner quadruple systems in
this paper. As a simple example, the vector space Zd2 (d ≥ 3)
with the set B of blocks taken to be the set of all subsets of
four distinct elements of Zd2 whose vector sum is zero, is a
non-trivial boolean Steiner quadruple system SQS(2d). More
geometrically, these SQS(2d) consist of the points and planes
of the d-dimensional binary affine space AG(d, 2).
Fig. 1. Illustration of the unique SQS(8), with three types of blocks:
faces, opposite edges, and inscribed regular tetrahedra.
For the existence of t-designs, basic necessary conditions
can be obtained via elementary counting arguments (see, for
instance, [10]):
Lemma 1: Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, k, λ) design, and for
a positive integer s ≤ t, let S ⊆ X with |S| = s. Then the
number of blocks containing each element of S is given by
λs = λ
(
v−s
t−s
)
(
k−s
t−s
) .
In particular, for t ≥ 2, a t-(v, k, λ) design is also an
s-(v, k, λs) design.
It is customary to set r := λ1 denoting the number of blocks
containing a given point. It follows
Lemma 2: Let D = (X,B) be a t-(v, k, λ) design. Then
the following holds:
(a) bk = vr.
(b)
(
v
t
)
λ = b
(
k
t
)
.
(c) r(k − 1) = λ2(v − 1) for t ≥ 2.
For encyclopedic accounts of key results in design theory,
we refer to [10], [11]. Various connections of designs with
coding and information theory can be found in a recent
survey [12] (with many additional references therein).
III. OPTIMAL AUTHENTICATION CODES
For our further purposes, we summarize the state-of-the-art
for authentication codes which bear no secrecy assumptions.
The following theorem (cf. [7], [13]) gives a combinatorial
lower bound on the number of encoding rules.
Theorem 2: [Massey–Scho¨bi] If an authentication code is
(t − 1)-fold against spoofing, then the number of encoding
rules is bounded below by
b ≥
(
v
t
)
(
k
t
) .
TABLE I
OPTIMAL AUTHENTICATION CODES WITH PERFECT SECRECY:
INFINITE CLASSES
tA tS k v b Ref.
1 1 q + 1 q
d+1
−1
q−1
v(v−1)
k(k−1)
[6]
q prime power d ≥ 2 even
1 1 3 v ≡ 1 (mod 6) v(v−1)
6
[1]
1 1 4 v ≡ 1 (mod 12) v(v−1)
12
[1]
1 1 5 v ≡ 1 (mod 20) v(v−1)
20
[1]
2 1 q + 1 qd + 1 v(v−1)(v−2)
k(k−1)(k−2)
[1]
q prime power d ≥ 2 even
2 1 4 v ≡ 2, 10 (mod 24) v(v−1)(v−2)
24
[1]
An authentication code is called optimal if the number of
encoding rules meets the lower bound with equality. When the
source states are known to be independent and equiprobable,
optimal authentication codes which are (t − 1)-fold secure
against spoofing can be constructed via t-designs (cf. [6], [13],
[14]).
Theorem 3: [DeSoete–Scho¨bi–Stinson] Suppose there is a
t-(v, k, λ) design. Then there is an authentication code for k
equiprobable source states, having v messages and λ ·
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding rules, that is (t − 1)-fold secure against spoofing.
Conversely, if there is an authentication code for k equiprob-
able source states, having v messages and
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding
rules, that is (t − 1)-fold secure against spoofing, then there
is a Steiner t-(v, k, 1) design.
IV. STINSON’S CONSTRUCTIONS & RECENT RESULTS
Using the notation introduced in Section II-A, we review
in Tables I and II previous constructions from [6], [1] for
equiprobable source probability distributions. This lists all
presently known optimal authentication codes with perfect
secrecy.
V. NEW CONSTRUCTIONS
Starting from the condition of perfect t-fold secrecy, we
obtain via Bayes’ Theorem that
pS(S
∗|M∗) =
pM (M
∗|S∗)pS(S
∗)
pM (M∗)
=
∑
{e∈E:S∗=fe(M∗)}
pE(e)pS(S
∗)∑
{e∈E:M∗⊆M(e)} pE(e)pS(fe(M
∗))
= pS(S
∗).
It follows
Lemma 3: An authentication code has perfect t-fold secrecy
if and only if, for every positive integer t∗ ≤ t, for every set
M∗ of t∗ messages observed in the channel and for every set
S∗ of t∗ source states, we have∑
{e∈E:S∗=fe(M∗)}
pE(e) =
∑
{e∈E:M∗⊆M(e)}
pE(e)pS(fe(M
∗)).
Hence, if the encoding rules in a code are used with equal
probability, then for every t∗ ≤ t, a given set of t∗ messages
TABLE II
OPTIMAL AUTHENTICATION CODES WITH PERFECT SECRECY:
FURTHER EXAMPLES
tA tS k v b Ref.
2 1 5 26 260 [1]
5 11 66 [1]
7 23 253 [1]
5 23 1.771 [1]
5 47 35.673 [1]
3 1 5 83 367.524 [1]
5 71 194.327 [1]
5 107 1.032.122 [1]
5 131 2.343.328 [1]
5 167 6.251.311 [1]
5 243 28.344.492 [1]
6 12 132 [1]
4 1 6 84 5.145.336 [1]
6 244 1.152.676.008 [1]
occurs with the same frequency in each t∗ columns of the
encoding matrix.
We can now establish an extension of the main theorem
in [1]. Our construction yields optimal authentication codes
which are multi-fold secure against spoofing and provide
perfect multi-fold secrecy.
Theorem 4: Suppose there is a Steiner t-(v, k, 1) design,
where
(
v
t∗
)
divides the number of blocks b for every positive
integer t∗ ≤ t − 1. Then there is an optimal authentication
code for k equiprobable source states, having v messages
and
(
v
t
)
/
(
k
t
)
encoding rules, that is (t− 1)-fold secure against
spoofing and simultaneously provides perfect (t− 1)-fold se-
crecy.
Proof: Let D = (X,B) be a Steiner t-(v, k, 1) design,
where
(
v
t∗
)
divides b for every positive integer t∗ ≤ t− 1. By
Theorem 3, the authentication code has (t− 1)-fold security
against spoofing attacks. Hence, it remains to prove that
the code also achieves perfect (t− 1)-fold secrecy under
the assumption that the encoding rules are used with equal
probability. With respect to Lemma 3, we have to show that,
for every t∗ ≤ t − 1, a given set of t∗ messages occurs
with the same frequency in each t∗ columns of the resulting
encoding matrix. This can be accomplished by ordering, for
each t∗ ≤ t − 1, every block of D in such a way that every
t∗-subset of X occurs in each possible choice in precisely
b/
(
v
t∗
)
blocks. Since every t∗-subset of X occurs in exactly
λt∗ =
(
v−t∗
t−t∗
)
/
(
k−t∗
t−t∗
)
blocks due to Lemma 1, necessarily
(
k
t∗
)
must divide λt∗ . By Lemma 2 (b), this is equivalent to saying
that
(
v
t∗
)
divides b. To show that the condition is also sufficient,
we consider the bipartite (t∗-subset, block) incidence graph of
D with vertex set
(
X
t∗
)
∪ B, where ({xi}t
∗
i=1, B) is an edge
if and only if xi ∈ B (1 ≤ i ≤ t∗) for {xi}t∗i=1 ∈
(
X
t∗
)
and
B ∈ B. An ordering on each block of D can be obtained via
an edge-coloring of this graph using
(
k
t∗
)
colors in such a way
that each vertex B ∈ B is adjacent to one edge of each color,
and each vertex {xi}t
∗
i=1 ∈
(
X
t∗
)
is adjacent to b/( k
t∗
)
edges of
each color. Specifically, this can be done by first splitting up
each vertex {xi}t
∗
i=1 into b/
(
k
t∗
)
copies, each having degree(
k
t∗
)
, and then by finding an appropriate edge-coloring of the
resulting
(
k
t∗
)
-regular bipartite graph using
(
k
t∗
)
colors. The
claim follows now by taking the ordered blocks as encoding
rules, each used with equal probability.
Remark 1: It follows from the proof that we may obtain
optimal authentication codes that provide (t− 1)-fold security
against spoofing and at the same time perfect (t′ − 1)-fold
secrecy for t′ ≤ t, when the assumption of the above theorem
holds with
(
v
t∗
)
divides b for every positive integer t∗ ≤ t′−1.
As an application, we give an infinite class of optimal codes
which are two-fold secure against spoofing and achieve perfect
two-fold secrecy. This appears to be the first infinite class of
authentication and secrecy codes with these properties.
Theorem 5: For all positive integers v ≡ 2 (mod 24), there
is an optimal authentication code for k = 4 equiprobable
source states, having v messages, and v(v − 1)(v − 2)/24
encoding rules, that is two-fold secure against spoofing and
provides perfect two-fold secrecy.
Proof: We will make use of Steiner quadruple systems
(cf. Section II-A). Hanani [15] showed that a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of a SQS(v) is that v ≡ 2
or 4 (mod 6) (v ≥ 4). Hence, the condition v | b is fulfilled
when v ≡ 2 or 10 (mod 24) and the condition (v2) | b when
v ≡ 2 (mod 12) in view Lemma 2 (b). Therefore, if we assume
that v ≡ 2 (mod 24), then we can apply Theorem 4 to establish
the claim.
We present the smallest example:
Example 1: An optimal authentication code for k = 4
equiprobable source states, having v = 26 messages, and
b = 650 encoding rules, that is two-fold secure against spoof-
ing and provides perfect two-fold secrecy can be constructed
from a Steiner quadruple system SQS(26). Each encoding rule
is used with probability 1/650.
Remark 2: For v = 26, the first SQS(v) was constructed by
Fitting [16], admitting a v-cycle as an automorphism (cyclic
SQS(v)). We generally remark that the number N(v) of
non-isomorphic SQS(v) is only known for v = 8, 10, 14, 16
with N(8) = N(10) = 1, N(14) = 4, and N(16) =
1,054,163 (cf. [17]). Lenz [18] proved that for the admissi-
ble values of v, the number N(v) grows exponentially, i.e.
lim infv→∞
logN(v)
v3
> 0. For comprehensive survey articles
on Steiner quadruple systems, we refer the reader to [19],
[20]. For classifications of specific classes of highly regular
Steiner quadruple systems and Steiner designs, see, e.g., [21],
[22].
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